United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, South Bend Division
OPINION AND ORDER
T. MOODY JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
summary that follows, the court refers only to undisputed
facts, or, if there is a dispute, notes that it
exists and relies on the version of the fact, or inference
therefrom, that is most favorable to plaintiff. This summary
provides an overview. Additional relevant undisputed facts
will be referred to in the analysis that follows.
in 2004, plaintiff was employed as a visiting lecturer in
voice at Indiana University - South Bend's Ernestine M.
Raclin School of the Arts ("the Raclin School").
(DE ## 27 ¶ 8, 89-3 at 11.) Initially, plaintiff was
hired for the position because of her "vast experience
in both teaching and performing." (DE # 89-3 at 15.) She
was paid a salary of $30, 000, which was the same amount
previously budgeted for a lecturer in music theory position.
(DE ## 83 at 4, 83-7, 83-9.) Plaintiff was tasked with
classroom responsibilities, assisting students in recitals,
and conducting the campus chorus. (DE # 89-3 at 38.)
August 2006, plaintiff was hired as a full-time voice
lecturer at the Raclin School, with a starting salary of $30,
750, with the $750 raise due to the "legislature's
percentage increase across the board for faculty members. It
was a cost of living [adjustment.]" (DE # 89-3 at 57,
63.) Her responsibilities remained the same as when she was a
"visiting" lecturer, although she no longer taught
choral music. (Id. at 63.) Plaintiff was expected to
meet a "full time equivalent" ("FTE") to
fulfill her duties as a lecturer, namely, teaching "12
credit hours per semester or the equivalent." (DE ##
89-4 at 23, 89-6 at 22.) This same FTE of 12 credit hours was
required of all lecturers, absent a special arrangement. (DE
# 89-5 at 23.)
note that plaintiff failed to meet one-hundred percent of her
FTE requirements in multiple semesters during her time as a
full-time lecturer. (DE ##83 ¶¶ 38-45, 83-10.)
Although plaintiff does not deny defendants' assertion on
this matter, she points out that she performed other tasks
aside from normal teaching duties. For a six-month period
from January 2008 to June 2008, plaintiff served as the
acting area coordinator while Dr. David Barton was on
sabbatical. (DE ## 89-3 at 31-32, 89-4 at 29.) During that
time, she was responsible for "hiring and firing
adjuncts, answering student complaints, [and] answering
problems with faculty." (DE # 89-3 at 87.) Plaintiff did
not receive extra pay for serving as the acting coordinator.
(DE # 89-4 at 30.)
plaintiff asserts that she was expected to perform music
(presumably a vocal performance) as part of her position. (DE
# 88 at 11.) Although plaintiff is not aware of a written
requirement to perform, she notes that her obligation to
perform was cited in her performance reviews by Dr. Marvin
Curtis. (DE # 89-5 at 35-36.) Specifically, Curtis
wrote "[i]t is expected that Professor Purcell be a more
active performer." (DE # 89-21 at 1.) However,
defendants deny that plaintiff was required to perform. (DE #
90 at 5.)
was notified on April 19, 2011 that she would not be
reappointed for the 2012-2013 academic year. (DE # 89-14.)
Her employment with the school effectively ended on June 30,
2012. (DE # 89-3 at 140.)
then filed the instant suit against Indiana University
(improperly sued as "Indiana University South
Bend"), the Indiana University Board of Trustees, the
President of Indiana University (Michael A. McRobbie), the
Chancellor of Indiana University South Bend (Una Mae Reck),
the State of Indiana, and Marvin Curtis (collectively,
"defendants"). (DE # 27.) Plaintiff alleges
violations of (1) the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA); (2) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; (3)
the Equal Pay Act; and, (4) Article I, Section 23 of the
Indiana Constitution. (Id.)
moved to dismiss plaintiff's ADEA, Title VII, and Indiana
constitutional claims. (DE # 29.) The court issued an order
dismissing plaintiff's ADEA claim in its entirety and
also dismissing the Title VII claim against the individual
defendants and as it relates to the decision not to renew
plaintiff's employment for another year of service as a
lecturer. (DE # 49.) The remaining defendants have filed a
motion for summary judgment. (DE # 81.) The motion has been
fully briefed and is ripe for ruling.
have moved for summary judgment. FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 56 requires the entry of summary judgment, after
adequate time for discovery, against a party "who fails
to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an
element essential to that party's case, and on which that
party will bear the burden of proof at trial."
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
"[S]ummary judgment is appropriate - in fact, is
mandated-where there are no disputed issues of material fact
and the movant must prevail as a matter of law. In other
words, the record must reveal that no reasonable jury could
find for the non-moving party." Dempsey v. Atchison,
Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 16 F.3d 832, 836 (7th
Cir. 1994) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating that
these requirements have been met. Carmichael v. Village
of Palatine, III, 605 F.3d 451, 460 (7th Cir. 2010).
"[T]he burden on the moving party may be discharged by
'showing' - that is, pointing out to the district
court-that there is an absence of evidence to support the
nonmoving party's case." Celotex, 477 U.S.
at 325. Once the moving party has met his burden, the
non-moving party must identify specific facts establishing
that there is a genuine issue of fact for trial. Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986);
Palmer v. Marion County, 327 F.3d 588, 595 (7th Cir.
2003) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324). In doing
so, the non-moving party cannot rest on the pleadings alone,
but must present fresh proof in support of its position.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Donovan v. City of
Milwaukee, 17 F.3d 944, 947 (7th Cir. 1994). In viewing
the facts presented on a motion for summary judgment, the
court must construe all facts in a light most favorable to
the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in
favor of that party. Chmiel v. JC Penney Life Ins.
Co., 158 F.3d 966 (7th Cir. 1998).