United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division
INDIANA CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION. INC. doing business as AMERICAN LIBERTIES UNION OF INDIANA, Plaintiff,
INDIANA SECRETARY OF STATE, MEMBERS OF THE INDIANA ELECTION COMMISSION, SUPERINTENDENT OF THE INDIANA STATE POLICE, Defendants.
ORDER ON CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
EVANS BARKER, JUDGE
cause is before the court on Plaintiff Indiana Civil
Liberties Union Foundation, Inc., d/b/a American Civil
Liberties Union of Indiana's ("ACLU") Motion
for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 35] and Defendants Indiana
Secretary of State, The Members of the Indiana Election
Commission, and the Superintendent of the Indiana State
Police's (collectively "the State") Cross
Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 38]. For the reasons
detailed herein, Plaintiff's motion is GRANTED
and Defendants' cross motion is DENIED.
and Procedural Background
1, 2015, Indiana Code § 3-11-8-17.5 went into effect,
Voters may use cellular telephones or other electronic
devices in the polls as long as electioneering or loud or
disruptive conversations do not occur.
voter may not do the following:
(1) Take a digital image or photograph of the voter's
ballot while the voter is in a polling place, an office of
the circuit court clerk (under IC 3-11-10-26), a satellite
office established under IC 3-11-10-26.3, or a vote center
established under IC 3-11-18.1-4, except to document and
report to a precinct officer, the county election board, or
the election division a problem with the functioning of the
(2) Distribute or share the image described in subdivision
(1) using social media or by any other means.
Ind. Code §3-11-8-17.5.
August 27, 2015, the ACLU invoked associational standing in
filing suit on behalf of its members who have taken
photographs of their election ballots in the past or intend
to do so in future elections, alleging that Ind. Code §
3-11-8-17.5 violates the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution. Dkt. 1, 17, 25. On September 4, 2015, the ACLU
moved for a preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin
application and enforcement of the law. Dkt. 8.
October 19, 2015, we granted the ACLU's motion for
preliminary injunction, concluding that Ind. Code §
3-11-8-17.5 embodies a content-based restriction on speech
that cannot survive strict scrutiny because it neither serves
compelling state interests nor is it narrowly tailored to
achieve those interests. Dkt. 32.
April 11, 2016, the ACLU filed a motion for summary judgment
requesting that our preliminary injunction become permanent.
Dkt. 35. On May 12, 2016, the State responded with a cross
motion for summary judgment essentially defending the state
statute and opposing the injunction. See Dkt. 38. The
parties' cross motions became fully briefed on June 21,
2016, and are now ripe for decision.
Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that summary judgment
should be granted when the evidence establishes that
"there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 322-323 (1986). The purpose of summary judgment is
to "pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in
order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial."
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Disputes concerning
material facts are genuine where the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248 (1986). In deciding whether genuine issues of
material fact exist, the court construes all facts in a light
most favorable to the nonmoving party and draws all
reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.
See Id. at 255. However, neither the "mere
existence of some alleged factual dispute between the
parties, " id., 477 U.S. at 247, nor the
existence of "some metaphysical doubt as to the material
facts, " Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, will
defeat a motion for summary judgment. Michas v. Health
Cost Controls of III, Inc., 209 F.3d 687, 692 (7th Cir.
often confront cross motions for summary judgment because
Rules 56(a) and (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
allow both plaintiffs and defendants to move for such relief.
In such situations, courts must consider each party's
motion individually to determine if that party has satisfied
the summary judgment standard. Kohl v. Ass'n. of
Trial Lawyers of Am., 183 F.R.D. 475 (D. Md. 1998).
Here, the Court has considered the parties' respective
memoranda and the exhibits attached thereto and has construed
all facts and drawn all reasonable inferences therefrom in
the light most favorable to the respective nonmovant.
Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 574. The parties before us,
by filing cross motions, stipulate that there are no material
facts in controversy and that their dispute is ripe for
decision on summary judgment.