United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, Hammond Division
EDWARD D. QUINN, Petitioner,
OPINION AND ORDER
S. VAN BOKKELEN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
D. Quinn, a pro se prisoner, filed a habeas corpus petition
challenging his conviction for voluntary manslaughter and 50
year sentence on August 18, 2000, by the Allen Superior Court
under cause number 02D04-9902-CF-81. He raises only one
ground. He argues that the trial court violated Indiana Code
35-38-1-2 by waiting 107 days to sentence him after
conviction and that the jury was not reconvened for the
violations of State law are not a basis for habeas corpus
relief. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991)
(“In conducting habeas review, a federal court is
limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States.”). Second, the Sixth Amendment guarantees the
right to a speedy trial, but not to speedy sentencing.
Betterman v. Montana, 136 S.Ct. 1609, 1613 (2016).
Third, habeas corpus petitions are subject to a strict one
year statute of limitations, and this petition is untimely.
(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an
application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The
limitation period shall run from the latest of--
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the
conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for
seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application
created by State action in violation of the Constitution or
laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was
prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was
initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has
been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or
claims presented could have been discovered through the
exercise of due diligence.
(2) The time during which a properly filed application for
State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect
to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be
counted toward any period of limitation under this
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). In response to question 16 asking
him to explain why the petition is timely (which includes the
text of the statute quoted above), Quinn wrote, “This
petition should be deemed timely as Plaintiff was not aware
of information of the this law until recently.” (DE 1
at 8.) Neither that response-nor anything else in the
petition-indicates that this claim is based on a newly
recognized Constitutional right or that a state-created
impediment prevented him from filing this petition sooner.
Therefore 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B) and (C) are not
applicable to this case.
because he argues that he has only recently learned about the
State statute, the Court will consider whether 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(d)(1)(D) is applicable. To qualify as a claim
based on newly discovered evidence, the claim must be
presented within one year from “the date on which the
factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have
been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.”
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). The Seventh Circuit has made
clear that the time runs from the date when the evidence
could have been discovered through diligent inquiry, not when
it was actually discovered or when its significance was
realized. Owens v. Boyd, 235 F.3d 356, 359 (7th Cir.
2001). In 2000, Quinn knew the date on which he was
convicted. He also knew the date when he was sentenced. These
are not recently discovered facts. Nevertheless, Quinn is
arguing that the habeas corpus statute of limitations should
not begin until he believed that he should have been
sentenced more quickly after he read the statute. This
argument was rejected by the Seventh Circuit in
Owens. “He proposes that the year to file a
federal petition begins when a prisoner actually understands
what legal theories are available. That is not what §
2244(d)(1) says.” Owens, 235 F.3d at 359.
If § 2244(d)(1) used a subjective rather than an
objective standard, then there would be no effective time
limit, as Owens's case illustrates. Like most members of
street gangs, Owens is young, has a limited education, and
knows little about the law. If these considerations delay the
period of limitations until the prisoner has spent a few
years in the institution's law library, however, then
§ 2244(d)(1) might as well not exist; few prisoners are
Id. Thus, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D) is not
applicable to this case.
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), the 1-year period
of limitation began on the date when the judgment became
final upon the expiration of the time for seeking direct
review of his conviction and sentence. On January 10, 2002,
the Court of Appeals of Indiana affirmed his conviction on
direct appeal. See Indiana Clerk of Appellate Courts
and Quinn v. State, 762 N.E.2d 792 (Ind.Ct.App.
2002) (table). Though he did not file a petition to transfer
to the Indiana Supreme Court, he had 30 days to do so.
See Ind. R. App. P. 57(C). Therefore the 1-year
period of ...