United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Terre Haute Division
ENTRY GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
DIRECTING ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT
William T. Lawrence, Judge.
Purvis filed an amended complaint in this action on March 9,
2016, contending that his Constitutional Rights were violated
while he was incarcerated in the Indiana Department of
Correction (“IDOC”). Mr. Purvis claims that the
defendant placed him in danger by sharing his charging and
sentencing information with another inmate in violation of
the Eighth Amendment. The offender the defendant shared the
information with has animosity toward prisoners, such as the
plaintiff, that had been convicted of sex offenses. Mr.
Purvis was allegedly assaulted by this offender in July of
2013. The defendant moves for summary judgment arguing that
Mr. Purvis failed to exhaust his available administrative
remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), before
filing this lawsuit.
judgment should be granted “if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The party seeking summary judgment
“bears the initial responsibility of informing the
district court of the basis for its motion, and
identifying” designated evidence which
“demonstrate[s] the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
the moving party has met its burden, the non-movant may not
rest upon mere allegations. Instead, “[t]o successfully
oppose a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party
must come forward with specific facts demonstrating that
there is a genuine issue for trial.” Trask-Morton
v. Motel 6 Operating L.P., 534 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir.
2008). “The non-movant will successfully oppose summary
judgment only when it presents definite, competent evidence
to rebut the motion.” Vukadinovich v. Bd. of Sch.
Trs., 278 F.3d 693, 699 (7th Cir. 2002) (internal
quotation and citation omitted).
Purvis has failed to respond to the motion for summary
judgment. By not responding properly and with evidentiary
materials, he has conceded the defendant's version of the
facts. Brasic v. Heinemann's Inc., 121 F.3d 281,
286 (7th Cir. 1997). This is the result of Local Rule
56-1(e), of which Mr. Purvis was notified [dkt. 33]. This
does not alter the standard for assessing a Rule 56(c)
motion, but does “reduc[e] the pool” from which
the facts and inferences relative to such a motion may be
drawn. Smith v. Severn, 129 F.3d 419, 426 (7th Cir.
times relevant to his Complaint, Mr. Purvis was confined by
the IDOC at Wabash Valley Correctional Facility
(“Wabash Valley”). The IDOC has an Offender
Grievance Process which is intended to permit inmates to
resolve concerns and complaints relating to their conditions
of confinement prior to filing suit in court. Under the
grievance program, offenders may grieve matters that involve
actions of individual staff.
Grievance Process consists of three steps. It begins with the
offender contacting staff to discuss the matter or incident
subject to the grievance and seeking informal resolution. If
the offender is unable to obtain a resolution of the
grievance informally, he may submit a formal grievance to the
Grievance Officer of the facility where the incident
occurred. If the formal written grievance is not resolved in
a manner that satisfies the offender, he may submit an
appeal. Exhaustion of the grievance procedure requires
pursuing a grievance to the final step. A grievance must be
filed within twenty (20) working days from the date of the
alleged incident, and exhaustion requires the inmate pursuing
an appeal to the final step of the grievance process.
Purvis alleges that the defendant shared his charging and
sentencing information with another offender in 2013. Then on
either July 20 or 23, 2013, he was assaulted by this
offender. The IDOC's grievance records for Mr. Purvis
reflect that he did not file any grievance regarding an
incident of being assaulted by another inmate in 2013. The
only grievance Mr. Purvis filed in 2013 involved a request
for a television.
defendants argue that Mr. Purvis failed to exhaust his
available administrative remedies as required by the PLRA
with respect to his claims against the defendant.
PLRA requires that a prisoner exhaust his available
administrative remedies before bringing a suit concerning
prison conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Porter v.
Nussle,534 U.S. 516, 524-25 (2002). “Proper
exhaustion demands compliance with an agency's deadlines
and other critical procedural rules because no adjudicative
system can function effectively without imposing some orderly
structure on the course of its proceedings.”
Woodford v. Ngo,548 U.S. 81, 90-91 (2006) (footnote
omitted); see also Dale v. Lappin,376 F.3d 652, 655
(7th Cir. 2004) (“In order to properly exhaust, a
prisoner must submit inmate complaints and appeals ‘in
the place, and at the time, the prison's administrative
rules require.'”)(quoting Pozo v.
McCaughtry,286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002)). Strict
compliance is required with respect to exhaustion, and a
prisoner must properly follow the prescribed administrative
procedures in order to exhaust his remedies. Dole v.
Chandler,438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2006). The
PLRA's exhaustion ...