from the Marion Superior Court The Honorable Shatrese M.
Flowers, Judge The Honorable David Seiter, Commissioner Trial
Court Cause No. 49G20-1409-F5-44249
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT James A. Edgar J. Edgar Law Offices,
Prof. Corp. Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Gregory F. Zoeller Attorney General of
Indiana Michael Gene Worden Deputy Attorney General
Andre Anderson appeals the admission at trial of a handgun
found pursuant to a search of his car following his arrest.
and Procedural History
On September 18, 2014, Anderson was pulled over by
Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department
("IMPD") Officer Cory Heiny after Officer Heiny ran
the license plate on the car and discovered its owner,
Anderson, had an outstanding warrant for strangulation and
his driving privileges were suspended. After confirming the
driver was Anderson, Officer Heiny requested he step out of
the vehicle. Anderson did so but not before removing his
jacket. Officer Heiny found Anderson's removal of his
jacket to be "uncommon." (Tr. at 34.)
Officer Heiny handcuffed Anderson and "placed [him] on
the median between [two police cars]." (Id. at
28.) Officer Heiny then returned to Anderson's car and
searched it before having it towed "because the vehicle
was impeding traffic." (Id. at 12.) When
Officer Heiny picked up Anderson's jacket, he noticed it
was heavy, so he searched the pockets. Officer Heiny
discovered a loaded handgun in the pocket. Anderson did not
have a license to carry it.
The State charged Anderson with Class A misdemeanor carrying
a handgun without a license and Level 5 felony carrying a handgun
without a license.Anderson filed a
motion to suppress the handgun. The trial court denied the
motion. At trial, Anderson objected to the admission of the
handgun but the objection was overruled. The trial court
found Anderson guilty and imposed a three-year sentence.
Anderson did not seek interlocutory review of the denial of
his motion to suppress but instead appeals following trial.
This issue is therefore "appropriately framed as whether
the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the
evidence at trial." Washington v. State, 784
N.E.2d 584, 587 (Ind.Ct.App. 2003). Our standard of review of
rulings on the admissibility of evidence is essentially the
same whether the challenge is made by a pre-trial motion to
suppress or by trial objection. Lundquist v. State,
834 N.E.2d 1061, 1067 (Ind.Ct.App. 2005). We do not
reweigh the evidence, and we consider conflicting evidence
most favorable to the trial court's ruling. Id.
However, we must also consider the uncontested evidence
favorable to the defendant. Id.
"Although a trial court's determination of
historical facts is entitled to deferential review, we employ
a de novo standard when reviewing the trial
court's ultimate determination of reasonable suspicion
and probable cause." Lindsey v. State, 916
N.E.2d 230, 238 (Ind.Ct.App. 2009), trans. denied.
In other words, when a trial court has admitted evidence
alleged to have been discovered as the result of an illegal
search or seizure, we generally will assume the trial court
accepted the evidence presented by the State and will not
reweigh that evidence, but we owe no deference as to whether