United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division
HERMAN M. GRIFFIN, Plaintiff,
I.D.O.C. Indiana Department of Correction, Defendant.
ENTRY GRANTING MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
AND DISMISSING COMPLAINT
WALTON PRATT, JUDGE
Herman M. Griffin's motion to proceed in forma
pauperis [dkt. 2] is granted. Notwithstanding the
foregoing ruling, Mr. Griffin still owes the entire filing
fee. “All [28 U.S.C.] § 1915 has ever done is
excuse pre-payment of the docket fees; a litigant
remains liable for them, and for other costs, although
poverty may make collection impossible.”
Abdul-Wadood v. Nathan, 91 F.3d 1023, 1025 (7th Cir.
courts have an obligation under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) to screen complaints filed by plaintiffs
proceeding in forma pauperis before service on the
defendants, and must dismiss the complaint if it is frivolous
or malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such
relief. In determining whether the complaint states a claim,
the Court applies the same standard as when addressing a
motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). See Lagerstrom v. Kingston, 463 F.3d 621,
624 (7th Cir. 2006).
survive dismissal under this rule,
[the] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Pro se
complaints such as that filed by Mr. Griffin are construed
liberally and held to a less stringent standard than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers. Obriecht v. Raemisch,
517 F.3d 489, 491 n.2 (7th Cir. 2008).
Griffin brings this action against the Indiana Department of
Correction and two correctional facilities at which he was
incarcerated, specifically New Castle Correctional Facility
and IYC Correctional Facility Plainfield. Mr. Griffin alleges
that various things happened to him during his incarceration
over the past several years. First, he was provided blood
pressure medication in 2007 and again in 2011, which he says
chemically castrated him. Second, the conditions of his
parole, given that he is a sex offender, do not permit him to
see underage children without permission, which violates his
Eighth Amendment rights. Finally, Mr. Griffin alleges a
state-law defamation claim based on the sex offender registry
improperly listing his crime of conviction as rape instead of
attempted rape. For the reasons set forth below, each of
these claims must be dismissed.
his claim regarding inadequate medical care in prison, a
plaintiff must allege that “he was ‘incarcerated
under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious
harm' and that [each defendant] was deliberately
indifferent to that risk.'” Olson v.
Morgan, 750 F.3d 708, 713 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). Mr.
Griffin fails to allege that any specific individual was
deliberately indifferent to such a risk. Moreover, even if he
did, his claim would be barred by the two year statute of
limitations that applies to § 1983 action in Indiana, as
the medications about which he complains were prescribed in
2007 and 2011. See Serino v. Hensley, 735 F.3d 588,
590 (7th Cir. 2013).
Griffin's claims regarding his conditions of parole fail
to state a constitutional violation, let alone an Eighth
Amendment violation as he alleges. Individuals can be
released on parole pursuant to certain conditions and that is
what appears to have occurred here.
state-law defamation claim, even if Mr. Griffin asserted a
viable claim, the Court ultimately has discretion whether to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a plaintiff's
state law claims. Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF BIO,
Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009); see 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(c) (“The district courts may decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . . if . .
. the district court has dismissed all claims over which it
has original jurisdiction . . . .”). As filed, there
are no viable federal claims in the complaint. The Court
declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state
law claims brought in this action given that all of the
federal claims are dismissed at a very early stage.
to state a claim under § 1983, each defendant must be
personally involved in the alleged constitutional violation.
See Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 656-57 (7th Cir.
2005); Reed v. McBride, 178 F.3d 849, 851-52 (7th
Cir. 1999); Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 992-93
(7th Cir. 1996). All of Mr. Griffin's § 1983 claims
must be dismissed ...