United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division
ENTRY GRANTING IN FORMA PAUPERIS MOTION, DISMISSING
COMPLAINT, AND DIRECTING PLAINTIFF TO SHOW
WALTON PRATT, JUDGE
matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs motion for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis and for
screening, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The
Court will address each matter in turn.
In Forma Pauperis
plaintiffs motion to proceed in forma pauperis [dkt.
2] is granted to the extent that he shall be permitted to pay
the $350.00 filing fee in seven (7) monthly installments of
$50.00. The first $50.00 payment shall be made to the Clerk
of the Court not later than December 8, 2016. Failure to make
these payments as directed may subject the action to
dismissal for failing to prosecute the action by paying the
complaint is subject to the screening requirement of 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). This statute requires the Court
to dismiss a complaint or claim within a complaint if it is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or
seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from
plaintiff, Robert Ginsbach, lives in Muncie, Indiana. He
brings claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress
and other state law claims against ten (10) defendants, whom
he reports are citizens of Ohio and Indiana. He also brings a
civil rights claim, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against three of
the defendants. The defendants are: 1) Rachell Bullock of
Ohio; 2) Tara Wright-Timberlake of Ohio; 3) Donovan Hill of
Ohio; 4) Teresa J. Brown of Indiana; 5) Linda Kate of Ohio;
6) Joy Reed of Ohio; 7) Lisa Riggs of Indiana; 8) Meridian
Health Service of Indiana; 9) Barbara Schwartz of Ohio; and
10) Chrysalis Counseling Center, Inc. of Ohio. The
allegations in the complaint are not clear, however it
appears the claims surround a family law matter regarding to
Ginsbach and his son, interference with custody, fraud and
failing to file criminal charges. For relief, Mr. Ginsbach
request that the Court order the return of his son, order
termination of employment for some of the defendants' and
first question that must be addressed is whether this Court
has subject matter jurisdiction. Most of the claims asserted
in the complaint are state law claims. It is not clear
because the complaint lacks sufficient factual allegations,
but it appears that Mr. Ginsbach's claims arose out of
incidents that occurred in Ohio. Federal district courts such
as this are "courts of limited jurisdiction."
Healy v. Metropolitan Pier & Exposition Auth.,
804 F.3d 836, 845 (7th Cir. 2015). They have original
"federal question" jurisdiction of "all civil
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of
the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331. They also
have "diversity" jurisdiction of all civil actions
which meet two requirements: First, there must be
"complete diversity" between all named plaintiffs
and all named defendants, meaning that "no plaintiff may
be a citizen of the same state as any defendant."
Altom Transport, Inc. v. Westchester Fire, Ins. Co.,
823 F.3d 416, 420 (7th Cir. 2016); see also 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). Second, the amount in controversy
must exceed $75, 000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). The Court of
Appeals has repeatedly held that "the party invoking
federal jurisdiction bears the burden of demonstrating its
existence." See Hart v. FedEx Ground Pkg. Sys.
Inc., 457 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 2006).
Court also lacks jurisdiction over domestic relations
matters. Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703
(1992) (reaffirming the "domestic relations
exception" to exercising diversity jurisdiction and
noted that this exception "divests the federal courts of
power to issue divorce, alimony, and child custody
decrees"); Jones v. Brennan, 465 F.3d 304, 306
(7th Cir. 2006) (the domestic-relations exception
"denies federal jurisdiction to grant a divorce or
exercise the other characteristic powers of a
domestic-relations court"). The complaint as presented
is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
it were not apparent that Mr. Ginsbach's claims are based
on domestic relations matters, the complaint lacks sufficient
factual allegations setting forth what happened, when, where,
and by whom. The complaint primarily lists various labels of
claims without adequate facts.
addition, a judge (such as Defendants Linda Kate and Joy
Reed), "has absolute immunity for any judicial actions
unless the judge acted in the absence of all
jurisdiction." Polzin v. Gage, 636
F.3d 834, 838 (7th Cir. 2011); see also Mireles v.
Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) ("Judicial immunity is
an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of
damages."). Therefore, the claims against these
defendants would also be barred by their immunity to suit.
Ginsbach alleges that some of the defendants violated 18
U.S.C. § 242. A criminal statute such as this does not
provide a private cause of action for civil liability.
Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir.
1980) (18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 provide no private
right of action and cannot form the basis of a civil suit).
Any claim based on Title 18 is dismissed for failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted.
complaint is deficient in the ways set forth above. "[A]
plaintiff can plead himself out of court by alleging facts
that show there is no viable claim." Pugh v. Tribune
Co.,521 F.3d 686, 699 (7th Cir. 2008). For the above
reasons, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and the
complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be