from the Marion Superior Court The Honorable Annie
Christ-Garcia, Judge Trial Court Cause No.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Corey L. Scott Indianapolis, Indiana.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Gregory F. Zoeller Attorney General of
Indiana Richard C. Webster Deputy Attorney General
Mickel Thacker challenges the sufficiency of evidence
supporting his conviction of Level 6 felony auto
theft and Class A misdemeanor resisting
law enforcement. We affirm.
and Procedural History
On April 9, 2015, Kelly Poyck reported her silver 2002
Chevrolet Prism stolen. On April 15, 2015, Jeanne Kistler, an
acquaintance of Poyck, saw the vehicle in a bank parking lot
and called 9-1-1. Kistler reported two African-American males
were in the front seat of the vehicle. Indianapolis
Metropolitan Police Department ("IMPD") officers
were dispatched regarding a possible stolen vehicle. IMPD
Officer Aaron Helton responded and spotted a vehicle matching
the description of the stolen vehicle with two
African-American males sitting in the front seat.
Officer Helton approached the vehicle with his emergency
lights on and briefly activated his siren. The occupants were
exiting the vehicle as Officer Helton approached it. Officer
Helton drew his weapon and loudly ordered them to stop. One
of the occupants ran from the scene. The other occupant,
Thacker, walked toward the bank. Officer Helton initially
pursued Thacker's companion, but when he was
approximately thirty feet from Thacker, Officer Helton
spotted Thacker near the bank entrance. At that point,
Thacker complied with Officer Helton's command to stop.
Officer Helton arrested Thacker.
The State charged Thacker with Level 6 felony auto theft and
Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. After a bench
trial, the court found Thacker guilty of both charges.
When reviewing sufficiency of the evidence in support of a
conviction, we will consider only probative evidence in the
light most favorable to the trial court's judgment.
Binkley v. State, 654 N.E.2d 736, 737 (Ind. 2007),
reh'g denied. The decision comes before us with
a presumption of legitimacy, and we will not substitute our
judgment for that of the fact-finder. Id. We do not
assess the credibility of the witnesses or reweigh the
evidence in determining whether the evidence is sufficient.
Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007).
Reversal is appropriate only when no reasonable fact-finder
could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id. Thus, the evidence is not
required to overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence
and is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn
from it to support the verdict. Id. at 147.
To prove Level 6 felony auto theft, the State must prove
Thacker "knowingly or intentionally exert[ed]
unauthorized control over the motor vehicle of another
person, with intent to deprive the owner of  the
vehicle's value or use." Ind. Code §
35-43-4-2.5(b)(1) (2014). The unexplained possession of
stolen property may be sufficient to support a conviction of
theft, Hughes v. State, 446 N.E.2d 1017, 1020
(Ind.Ct.App. 1983), but the inference is permitted only where
the property was "recently stolen." Gibson v.
State, 533 N.E.2d 187, 188-89 (Ind.Ct.App. 1989). If a
defendant is found to be in possession of stolen property
that was not recently stolen and if exclusive possession is
not proven, "this court may also consider additional
evidence tending to support the defendant's
conviction." Shelby v. State, 875 N.E.2d 381,
385 (Ind.Ct.App. 2007), trans. denied. For example,
in Gibson, we determined that unexplained possession
of a car two days after it was stolen was insufficient to
sustain a conviction for auto theft but affirmed the
conviction due to Gibson's possession of a screwdriver
used to start the car. 533 N.E.2d at 190.
Poyck testified her vehicle was stolen, and Officer Helton
saw Thacker in the driver's seat of Poyck's vehicle.
This evidence permits a reasonable inference Thacker was in
possession of Poyck's stolen vehicle. See Trotter v.
State, 838 N.E.2d 553, 557 (Ind.Ct.App. 2005)