United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, Hammond Division
OPINION AND ORDER
P. Rodovich United States Magistrate Judge
matter is before the court on the Motion for Bill of
Particulars [DE 397] filed by the defendant, William D.
Salazar, on August 30, 2016. For the reasons set forth below,
the motion is DENIED.
21, 2016, the grand jury returned the Second Superseding
Indictment against the defendant and sixteen other
individuals. The defendant, William D. Salazar, currently is
charged with conspiracy to participate in racketeering
activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) and
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to
distribute cocaine and marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 846. A conviction under each charge carries a maximum
penalty of life imprisonment.
indictment indicated that the defendants were members of the
“Almighty Latin Kings Nation”, hereinafter
“Latin Kings”, and that they conspired and
participated both directly and indirectly in the acts of
murder, robbery, intimidation, aggravated battery, aggravated
assault, and narcotics trafficking. The indictment set forth
forty-nine overt acts committed in furtherance of the
conspiracy. Salazar was named in the overt acts for his
appointment as enforcer of the Latin King's Indiana
Region and being ordered to have various members of the Latin
Kings beaten for breaking the rules of the Latin Kings.
Salazar was arraigned on August 16, 2016 and pleaded not
pending motion seeks information concerning the names of all
unindicted co-conspirators; the date, time, place, and manner
in which the defendant is alleged to have become a member of
the conspiracies alleged in Counts I and II; and the date,
time, and location of specific acts done in furtherance of
the conspiracy alleged in Count I and Count II, along with
the name of the individual alleged to have performed those
acts. The Government filed a response to Salazar's motion
on September 6, 2016 [DE 404]. Salazar did not file a reply.
Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(f) provides:
The court may direct the government to file a bill of
particulars. The defendant may move for a bill of particulars
before or within 10 days after arraignment or at a later time
if the court permits. The government may amend a bill of
particulars subject to such conditions as justice requires.
determining whether to grant the bill of particulars,
“[t]he standard is whether the government's
indictment sufficiently apprises the defendant of the charges
to enable him to prepare for trial.” United States
v. Canino, 949 F.2d 928, 949 (7th Cir.1991). See
also United States v. Vaughn, 722 F.3d 918, 927
(7th Cir. 2013); United States v.
Fassnacht, 332 F.3d 440, 446 (7th Cir. 2003); United
States v. Glecier, 923 F.2d 496, 501 (7th Cir. 1991);
United States v. Andrus, 775 F.2d 825, 843 (7th Cir.
defendant is only entitled to know the offense with which he
is charged, not all the evidence of how it will be proved.
See United States v. Kendall, 665 F.2d 126, 135 (7th
Cir. 1981). The indictment is not required to “detail
every factual nugget necessary for conviction”, nor is
it required to “allege in detail the factual proof that
will be relied on to support the charges.” United
States v. Smith, 230 F.3d 300, 306 (7th Cir. 2000).
Indeed, the Seventh Circuit has held that a bill of
particulars is not necessary when an indictment lays out the
elements of the charged offenses, gives sufficient notice of
the charges to allow the defendant to prepare a defense,
gives the time and place of the accused's allegedly
criminal conduct, and cites the applicable statute or
statutes. Vaughn, 722 F.3d at 927; See also
United States v. Hernandez, 330 F.3d 964, 975 (7th Cir.
2003); Fassnacht, 332 F.3d at 446. The
defendant's constitutional right is to know the offense
with which he is charged, not to know the details of how it
will be proved. Fassnacht, 332 F.3d at 466 (quoting
United States v. Kendall, 665 F.2d 126, 135 (7th
Cir. 1981)). The key question is whether the defendant was
sufficiently apprised of the charges against him in order to
enable adequate trial preparation. Vaughn, 722 F.3d
at 927 (quoting United States v. Blanchard, 542 F.3d
1133, 1140 (7th Cir. 2008)).
making this determination, the court is not required to
consider only the indictment. The information may be provided
to the defendant through “some other satisfactory
form.” Canino, 949 F.2d at 949 (the government
had maintained an “open-file” policy);
Fassnacht, 332 F.3d at 447 n. 2 (“the
government in this case provided the defendants with
extensive pretrial discovery, giving them full access to all
documentary evidence in the government's possession, thus
further obviating the need for a bill of particulars”);
Glecier, 923 F.2d at 501-02 (a “volume of
documents and records” had been provided by the
government during discovery). Adequate discovery can
“satisfy the need for a bill of particulars.”
Vaughn, 722 F.3d at 928.
RICO conspiracy, the Government, “need only charge --
after identifying a proper enterprise and the defendant's
association with that enterprise -- that the defendant
knowingly joined a conspiracy the objective of which was to
operate that enterprise through an identified pattern of
racketeering activity.” Glecier, 923 F.2d at
has argued that the indictment does not contain any
allegation of overt acts committed by him. Yet, Count I of
the indictment has alleged that Castillo appointed Salazar
enforcer of the Latin Kings and Count II alleged that Salazar
conspired to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms
or more of marijuana, and five kilograms or more of cocaine.
Salazar has argued that to prepare and investigate the case
properly he needs the names of all unindicted alleged
co-conspirators; the date, time, place, and manner in which
the defendant is alleged to have become a member of the
conspiracies alleged in Counts I and II; and the date, time,