United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Terre Haute Division
ENTRY DISCUSSING DEFENDANTS' AMENDED MOTION FOR
Jane Magnus-Stinson, Judge.
Lionel Gibson filed this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against a variety of defendants alleging that
they are liable to him because they provided him with
inadequate medical treatment. There are three defendants
remaining in this action: Marla Gadberry, Lolit Joseph, M.D.
and John Clarkson, M.D. Mr. Gibson alleges that these
defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights through their
deliberate indifference to his scalp condition. There is also
a state law tort claim against Ms. Gadberry. All other claims
and defendants have been dismissed.The defendants seek
resolution of the remaining claims through summary judgment.
For the reasons explained below, Ms. Gadberry is entitled to
judgment in her favor on all claims while the claims against
Dr. Joseph and Dr. Clarkson cannot be resolved through
summary judgment. Accordingly, the amended motion for summary
judgment [dkt. 127] is granted in part and denied in part.
judgment is appropriate when the movant shows that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A “material
fact” is one that “might affect the outcome of
the suit.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). To survive a motion for summary
judgment, the non-moving party must set forth specific,
admissible evidence showing that there is a material issue
for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
323 (1986). The Court views the record in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party and draws all reasonable
inferences in that party's favor. Darst v. Interstate
Brands Corp., 512 F.3d 903, 907 (7th Cir. 2008). It
cannot weigh evidence or make credibility determinations on
summary judgment because those tasks are left to the
fact-finder. O'Leary v. Accretive Health, Inc.,
657 F.3d 625, 630 (7th Cir. 2011).
dispute about a material fact is genuine only “if the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson,
477 U.S. at 248. If no reasonable jury could find for the
non-moving party, then there is no “genuine”
dispute. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).
of Local Rules
preliminary matter, the defendants argue in their reply brief
that the plaintiff's response violates the Local Rules of
this Court. While it is “well established that pro se
litigants are not excused from compliance with procedural
rules, ” Pearle Vision, Inc. v. Romm, 541 F.3d
751, 758 (7th Cir. 2008), whether the Court holds pro se
litigants to the consequences of violating the Court's
Local Rules is a matter of discretion. Gray v.
Hardy, 826 F.3d 1000, 1004-05 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding
that district courts are not required to hold pro se
litigants to the potential consequences of their failure to
comply with the Local Rules and can instead take “a
more flexible approach, ” including by ignoring the
deficiencies in their filings and considering the evidence
they submit). In this case, the Court chooses to take the
more flexible approach, and overlooks the page limit
violation and other errors in formatting.
Gibson asserts Eighth Amendment medical care claims against
the defendants. At all times relevant to Mr. Gibson's
claims, he was a convicted offender. Accordingly, his
treatment and the conditions of his confinement are evaluated
under standards established by the Eighth Amendment's
proscription against the imposition of cruel and unusual
punishment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31
(1993) (“It is undisputed that the treatment a prisoner
receives in prison and the conditions under which he is
confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth
prevail on an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference
medical claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate two elements: (1)
he suffered from an objectively serious medical condition;
and (2) the defendant knew about the plaintiff's
condition and the substantial risk of harm it posed, but
disregarded that risk. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 837 (1994); Pittman ex rel. Hamilton v. County of
Madison, Ill., 746 F.3d 766, 775 (7th Cir. 2014).
is ‘deliberately indifferent' when the official has
acted in an intentional or criminally reckless manner.”
Board v. Freeman, 394 F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir. 2005).
The Seventh ...