United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division
ENTRY DISCUSSING PENDING MOTIONS AND DISMISSING
WALTON PRATT, JUDGE.
Alastair Dominic Moton's (“Mr. Moton”)
request to proceed in forma pauperis [dkt. 2] is
granted. The assessment of even an initial partial filing fee
is not feasible at this time.
Moton's motion for summary judgment [dkt. 4] is denied.
The motion is premature and does not establish that the
plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law under
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Moton's motion for change of venue states: “I have
been having too many civil rights constitutional violations
and I'm a mental patient and my mother just died.”
The plaintiff's motion does not state what would be a
better venue for this action and it appears that the Southern
District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division, is the most
appropriate venue. The motion to change venue [dkt. 5] is
complaint is now subject to the screening requirement of 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e). District courts have an obligation
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) to screen complaints
before service on the defendants, and must dismiss the
complaint if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a
claim for relief, or seeks monetary relief against a
defendant who is immune from such relief. Dismissal under the
in forma pauperis statute is an exercise of the
Court's discretion. Denton v. Hernandez, 504
U.S. 25, 34 (1992). In determining whether the complaint
states a claim, the Court applies the same standard as when
addressing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). See Lagerstrom v. Kingston, 463
F.3d 621, 624 (7th Cir. 2006). To survive dismissal under
federal pleading standards,
[the] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Thus, a
“plaintiff must do better than putting a few words on
paper that, in the hands of an imaginative reader,
might suggest that something has happened to her
that might be redressed by the law.” Swanson v.
Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 403 (7th Cir.2010)
(emphasis in original).
presented, Mr. Moton's Complaint fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. Mr. Moton's Complaint
(Filing No. 1) alleges that on September 20, 2016, at 6:30
p.m., he was at the Speedway gas station located at 1640 E.
Washington Street, Indianapolis Indiana. He went into the
single person bathroom and locked the door to take “a
number 2.” After about 15-20 minutes he heard on knock
on the door. Mr. Motion responded saying, “I'm in
here.” The person knocked again and said,
“police.” Mr. Motion said “okay.” The
officer knocked again and Mr. Moton said, “I'm
coming.” Then the door was unlocked and opened. At that
time, Mr. Motion had his shirt off, his pants were down, and
was mad because of the invasion of privacy, harassment, pain
and suffering, and mental anguish. The officer asked him what
he was doing and he said, “taking a crap.” The
officer said, “with your shirt off?” and
“this is not a wash up place.” The officer then
asked for his ID and Mr. Moton gave it to him. The officer
ran his name and told him that a lady was driving past and
said she saw a man walk into the gas station with a hood on
and thought he was going to rob the place. Mr. Motion was
told to leave without further incident.
next day, Mr. Motion filed an incident report and he was
later told that the officer did not make a report. Attached
to the complaint is a dispatch search result which shows that
an offer was dispatched to the Speedway gas station on
September 20, 2016, at 6:22 p.m. The officer arrived at the
gas station three minutes later and “closed” the
run at 6:46 p.m. Mr. Motion seeks more than 90 million
dollars. He alleges cruel and unusual punishment because
while he “was in the bathroom taking a crap” the
officer walked in on him, made him get off the toilet, put
his shirt and pants up and leave. Mr. Morton asserts that he
was discriminated against in a public place.
situation is unfortunate for several reasons, but there is no
plausible basis to conclude that the defendant, Indianapolis
Metropolitan Police Officer Allen Leinbender, violated any of
Mr. Moton's federally secured rights. Mr. Motion's
interaction with the officer was brief, he was not taken into
custody, nor was he charged with any crime. The officer was
simply responding to a report of a suspicious person. The
officer's interruption and intrusion of Mr. Moton was
indeed rude, ...