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Smith v. Julian

United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Terre Haute Division

September 8, 2016

KEION LAMONE SMITH, Petitioner,
v.
S. JULIAN, Warden, Respondent.

          ENTRY DIRECTING FURTHER PROCEEDINGS

          HON. WILLIAM T. LAWRENCE, JUDGE

         I.

         A.

         The Attorney General is responsible for calculating a federal prisoner's period of incarceration for the sentence imposed, and to provide credit for time served, for offenses committed after November 1, 1987. 18 U.S.C. § 3585; 28 C.F.R. § 0.96; United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 331-32 (1992). An inmate may challenge the BOP's computation of his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. United States v. Tindall, 455 F.3d 885, 888 (8th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1152 (2007) (“Prisoners are entitled to administrative review of the computation of their credits . . . and after properly exhausting these administrative remedies, an inmate may seek judicial review through filing a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241”). The petitioner in this action presents such a challenge.

         B.

         Petitioner Keion Lamone Smith is confined within this District serving the executed portion of a sentence following his conviction in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. PACER records show that no appeal was taken from his conviction and that the motion for relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 filed in June 2016 remains pending. Williams seeks a seeks a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3), contending that the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) has improperly computed his sentence by failing to give him credit for time in pretrial custody from August 21, 2013 through March 18, 2014.

         II.

         A.

         According to 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a), “[a] sentence to a term of imprisonment commences on the date the defendant is received in custody awaiting transportation to . . . the official detention facility at which the sentence is to be served.” Credit for prior custody is specifically addressed by 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b), which provides:

A defendant shall be given credit toward the service of a term of imprisonment for any time he has spent in official detention prior to the date the sentence commences-
(1) as a result of the offense for which the sentence was imposed; or
(2) as a result of any other charge for which the defendant was arrested after the commission of the offense for which the sentence was imposed; that has not been credited against another sentence.

         The Seventh Circuit has made clear that § 3585(b) forbids the BOP from giving prior custody credit when that credit has been applied to another sentence. See Gigsby v. Bledsoe, 223 Fed.Appx. 486, 489 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Ross, 219 F.3d 592, 594 (7th Cir. 2000). In Gigsby, the Seventh Circuit determined that where the state credited the petitioner for time spent in custody before the commencement of his federal sentence, he was not entitled to the same ...


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