United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division
ENTRY CONCERNING SELECTED MATTERS
WALTON PRATT, JUDGE.
a civil rights action in which the plaintiff seeks a
preliminary injunction. A hearing on the motion for issuance
of a preliminary injunction has been set for December 13,
2016. This is a case in which only injunctive relief is
sought, and on a single claim. A procedure which commends
itself in these circumstances is prescribed by Rule 65(a)(2)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
(2) Consolidation of Hearing With Trial on Merits.
Before or after the commencement of the hearing of an
application for a preliminary injunction, the court may order
the trial of the action on the merits to be advanced and
consolidated with the hearing of the application.
the foregoing procedure requires application of the principle
announced in Pughsley v. 3750 Lake Shore Drive Coop.
Bldg., 463 F.2d 1055, 1057 (7th Cir. 1972), that
“the parties should normally receive clear and
unambiguous notice . . . either before the hearing commences
or at a time which will still afford the parties a full
opportunity to present their respective cases.”
Consistent with the foregoing, it was prudently observed that
“the parties should be given a clear opportunity to
object, or to suggest special procedures, if a consolidation
is to be ordered.” Id. This principle is cited
with approval in Univ. of Texas v. Camenisch, 451
U.S. 390, 395 (1981).
with the review of Rule 65(a)(2) in Part I of this Entry, the
parties are notified that the Court proposes to combine
the hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction with
trial on the merits.
parties shall have through September 20, 2016 in which to
consent to, in which to object to, or in which to propose
special procedures pertaining to, consolidating the hearing
on the motion for preliminary injunction with trial on the
defendants are two state officials sued in their official
capacities. “Official capacity suits “generally
represent only another way of pleading an action against an
entity of which an officer is an agent.” Kentucky
v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985); see also
Klebanowski v. Sheahan, 540 F.3d 633, 637 (7th Cir.
2008); Guzman v. Sheahan, 495 F.3d 852, 856 (7th
Cir. 2007). The same relief appears to be sought from each
State of Indiana and its agencies cannot be sued in federal
court in the circumstances suggested by the complaint.
Nunez v. Indiana Dep't of Child Servs., 817 F.3d
1042, 1044 (7th Cir. 2016). However, the plaintiff may seek
injunctive and declaratory relief against individual state
defendants sued in their official capacities in federal court
to “end a continuing violation of federal law.”
Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985); see
also Sorrentino v. Godinez, 777 F.3d 410, 415 (7th Cir.
2015)(“Sovereign immunity normally does not bar suits
for injunctive relief in federal court alleging that a state
official violated the federal constitution or laws. See
Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed.
12(f) provides that a district court “may strike from a
pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant,
immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f). The court may either strike on its own or
on a motion by a party and has considerable discretion in
striking any redundant, immaterial, impertinent or scandalous
matter.” Delta Consulting Grp., Inc. v. R. Randle
Const., Inc., 554 F.3d 1133, 1141 (7th Cir. 2009).
on the foregoing, the plaintiff shall have through September
20, 2016 in which to either voluntarily dismiss one
of the designated defendants or show cause why the
Court should not ...