United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, Hammond Division
TIMOTHY J. KOMOSCAR and KELLY A. KOMOSCAR, Individually and on behalf of N.A.K., R.E.K., N.R.K. and A.J.K, Minor Children, Plaintiffs,
MICHAEL R. PENCE, Governor of the State of Indiana, MARY BETH BONAVENTURA, Director of the Indiana Department of Child Services, TERRANCE K. CIBOCH, LOUELLA F. RICHEY, TAMARA G. LOOMIS, BRITTNEY D. SCHMIDT, and the INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SERVICES, Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
S. VAN BOKKELEN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Timothy and Kelly A. Komoscar sued Defendants Michael R.
Pence, the Governor of the state of Indiana; the Department
of Child Services (DCS); Mary Beth Bonaventura, director of
DCS; and Terrance K. Ciboch, the regional manager of DCS; as
well as DCS employees Louella F. Richey, Tamara G. Loomis,
and Brittney D. Schmidt. Plaintiffs claim defendants violated
various federal and state laws by establishing and carrying
out policies and procedures that resulted in DCS wrongfully
taking their children into custody and withholding adequate
psychological care. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(c), Pence and Bonaventura moved for judgment on
the pleadings; while remaining defendants moved for partial
judgment on the pleadings.
Amended Complaint alleges the following: on April 24, 2014,
DCS removed Plaintiffs' children from their home and
initiated a Child in Need of Services action pursuant to
Indiana Code § 31-34-1-1 et seq. The children
remained in DCS custody for almost three months, at which
time an administrative law judge ordered that the children be
break down their claims as follows:
. Pence, Bonaventura, and Ciboch established
and maintained policies and procedures that violated the
Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution as well as the Indiana Constitution; Richey,
Loomis, and Schmidt carried out these policies and
procedures, further compounding the violations of Plaintiff s
. DCS was negligent in hiring and retaining
its employees and negligent in its operations; and it
intentionally and negligently inflicted emotional distress
. Richey, Loomis, and Schmidt acted
willfully and wantonly against Plaintiffs and intentionally
inflicted emotional distress upon them.
to Rule 12(c), Pence and Bonaventura moved for judgment on
the pleadings and remaining defendants moved for partial
judgment on the pleadings.
Standard of Review
motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is evaluated by the same
standards as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
under Rule 12(b)(6). Pisciotta v. Old Nat'l
Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 633 (7th Cir. 2007). “The
facts alleged in the complaint are taken as true, drawing all
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.”
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint “must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). A claim has facial plausibility when it allows the
court to draw reasonable inferences that the defendant is
liable for the alleged misconduct. Id.
complaint must contain only a “short plain statement of
the claim showing plaintiff is entitled to relief.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). But, while there is no need for
detailed factual allegations, the plaintiff must “give
the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.” Olson v. Champaign
County, 784 F.3d 1093, 1099 (7th Cir. 2015).
The “factual allegations must be enough to raise a
right to relief above the speculative level.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (2007).