United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division
ENTRY DISCUSSING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
EVANS BARKER, JUDGE.
parties to this civil rights action are plaintiff Paul Lewis,
an Indiana prison, and defendant Beverly Gilmore, who was
formerly employed by the Indiana Department of Correction
(“DOC”) at the facility where the plaintiff was
confined. Lewis' claim is that in 2011 Casework Manager
Beverly Gilmore permitted his cell to be opened and Lewis to
be raped. He seeks “permanent injunctions, compensatory
damages [and] punitive damages, ” although the claim
for injunctive relief has been dismissed. In addition, claims
against other defendants were dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(b) as legally insufficient in paragraphs 4 and 5
of the Entry of January 27, 2014.
Gilmore has appeared by counsel and seeks resolution of
Lewis' claim through the entry of summary judgment. Lewis
has not responded to that motion.
reasons explained in this Entry, the motion for summary
judgment must be granted.
court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A "material fact" is one that
"might affect the outcome of the suit."
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986). A dispute over “material fact” is
“genuine” if “the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial
responsibility of informing the district court of the basis
for its motion, and identifying those portions of 'the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
Gilmore challenges Lewis' claim for lack of evidence. The
moving party on summary judgment need not do more. See
Modrowski v. Pigatto, 712 F.3d 1166, 1168 (7th Cir.
2013) (moving party may simply point out “an absence of
evidence to support the nonmoving party's case”).
The court will enter summary judgment against a party who
does not “come forward with evidence that would
reasonably permit the finder of fact to find in [its] favor
on a material question.” Id. at 1167. Once the
movant discharges her burden, the burden shifts to the
nonmovant to “make a showing sufficient to establish
the existence of an element essential to that party's
case.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. To satisfy
this burden, a nonmovant must “go beyond the pleadings
. . . to demonstrate that there is evidence upon which a jury
could properly proceed to find a verdict in her favor.”
Modrowski, 712 F.3d at 1169 (internal quotation
marks omitted). “A plaintiff may not defeat the
defendant's properly supported motion for summary
judgment without offering any significant probative evidence
tending to support the complaint.” Tri-Gen Inc. v.
Int'l Union of Operating Engineers, Local 150,
AFL-CIO, 433 F.3d 1024, 1038 (7th Cir. 2006).
viewing the facts presented on a motion for summary judgment,
a court must construe all facts in a light most favorable to
the non-moving party and draw all legitimate inferences in
favor of that party. NLFC, Inc. v. Devcom Mid-Am.,
Inc., 45 F.3d 231, 234 (7th Cir. 1995); Doe v. R.R.
Donnelley & Sons Co., 42 F.3d 439, 443 (7th Cir.
1994). However, “before a non-movant can benefit from a
favorable view of the evidence, it must show that there is
some genuine evidentiary dispute.” SMS Demag
Aktiengesellschaft v. Material Scis. Corp., 565 F.3d
365, 368 (7th Cir. 2009).
has not opposed the motion for summary judgment. The
consequence of this is that he has conceded the
defendant's version of the facts. The Seventh Circuit has
“consistently held that a failure to respond by the
non-movant as mandated by the local rules is an
admission.” Smith v. Lamz, 321 F.3d 680, 683
(7th Cir. 2003)(“[F]ailure to respond by the nonmovant
as mandated by the local rules results in an
admission.”); Waldridge v. American Hoechst
Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 921-22 (7th Cir. 1994). This does
not alter the standard for assessing a Rule 56(a) motion, but
does “reduc[e] the pool” from which the facts and
inferences relative to such a motion may be drawn. Smith
v. Severn, 129 F.3d 419, 426 (7th Cir. 1997).
time pertinent to his claim in this action Lewis was confined
at the Wabash Valley Correctional Facility (“Wabash
Valley”), assigned to Cell A-1201, and Gilmore was a
casework manager at Wabash Valley.
has a longtime nemesis, Lake County Deputy Sheriff Sullivan.
Lewis alleges that on June 18, 2011, Gilmore permitted
Sullivan to enter the Wabash Valley cell house to which Lewis
was assigned, that Gilmore did so in return for having been
paid $500 by Sullivan, and that Gilmore drugged Lewis,
causing Lewis to become unconscious and enabling Sullivan to
rape Lewis. In contrast ...