United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division
RANDY JOHNSON, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff,
NAVIENT SOLUTIONS, INC., f/k/a SALLIE MAE, INC., Defendant
RANDY JOHNSON, on behalf of himself and others similarly
situated, Plaintiff: Aaron David Radbil, GREENWALD DAVIDSON
RADBIL PLLC, Austin, TX; Michael L. Greenwald, GREENWALD
DAVIDSON RADBIL PLLC, Boca Raton, FL; Ryan Scott Lee, KROHN &
MOSS LTD., Los Angeles, CA.
NAVIENT SOLUTIONS, INC., formerly known as SALLIE MAE, INC.,
Defendant: David M. Cummings, Jeanah Park, VEDDER PRICE,
P.C., Chicago, IL; Lisa M. Simonetti, VEDDER PRICE LLP, Los
ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STAY
J. McKINNEY, United States District Judge.
Navient Solutions, Inc. (" Navient" ) has moved to
stay this action pending a ruling by the Supreme Court in the
cause styled Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409
(9th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S.Ct. 1892, 191
L.Ed.2d 762 (2015). Dkt. No. 43. Plaintiff Randy Johnson, on
behalf of himself and all others similarly situated ("
Johnson" ), opposes the motion.
reasons stated herein, the Court DENIES the Motion to Stay.
case, Johnson alleges that Navient violated the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act,
47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. (the " TCPA"
), when it used an automatic telephone dialing system, or an
artificial prerecorded voice, to place non-emergency calls to
his cell phone without his permission. Compl. ¶ 53. Johnson
seeks both injunctive and monetary relief. Compl. ¶¶ 54(e) &
claims that Johnson has abandoned his claim for actual
damages; therefore, because he cannot show harm and rests on
statutory damages alone, depending upon the ruling in
Robins, he may not have standing to bring suit. Dkt.
No. 43 at 1-8. In Robins, the issue is whether or
not a plaintiff has standing based on a claim for statutory
damages alone. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins,
135 S.Ct. 1892, 191 L.Ed.2d 762 (2015). Navient asserts that
it would save the time and effort by the parties as well as
conserve judicial resource to stay this action until
Robins is decided. Id. at 3-7. Navient
contends that a stay is the growing trend among district
courts facing an " injury in law" claim.
Id. at 2 & n.1 (citing cases).
contrary, Johnson asserts that the Supreme Court's grant
of certiorari in another case does cannot change current
Seventh Circuit precedent that concluded that actual damages
are not a precondition to recover statutory damages under the
Fair Credit Reporting Act (" FCRA" ), a similar
consumer protection statute. Dkt. No. 45 at 2-4 (citing,
inter alia, Killingsworth v. HSBC Bank Nevada,
N.A., 507 F.3d 614, 622 (7th Cir. 2007)). Johnson also
claims that he is asserting a claim for actual damages/actual
injury and that his failure to produce documentary evidence
of those damages to date cannot preclude him from continuing
to pursue that claim. Id. at 5-8. Further, Johnson
argues that the wrongful, active intrusion into Johnson's
life is actionable because preservation of privacy is one of
the primary purposes of the TCPA. Id. at 9-12.
Court has the inherent power to issue a stay to promote
efficiency and to save time and money for litigants.
See Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248,
254, 57 S.Ct. 163, 81 L.Ed. 153 (1936). As Navient suggests,
the Court " should grant a motion to stay if a higher
court in a separate case will decide issues of law that are
significant to the case sought to be stayed." Dkt. No.
43, at 4 (citing Cambell v. Wagner, No. NA 86-271-C,
1987 WL 16945, at *1 (S.D. Ind. May 18, 1987)). The Court may
consider three factors in ruling on the Motion to Stay: the
prejudice or tactical disadvantage to the non-moving party;
whether or not issues will be simplified by the decision in
the other case; and whether or not a stay will reduce the
burden of litigation on a party. See Cook Inc.
v. Endologix, Inc., No. 1:09-cv-01248-WTL-TAB, 2010 WL
325960, at *1 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 21, 2010).
on the allegations in the Complaint and the TCPA's
protection of Johnson's privacy rights, the Court
concludes that Johnson has stated a claim for actual harm,
upon which he may rely to provide standing. AccordSchumacher v. Credit Protection Ass'n, Cause No.
4:13-cv-00164-SEB-DML, 2015 WL 5786139, at *5 (S.D. In. Sept.
30, 2015); Martin v. Leading Edge Recovery Solutions,
LLC, Cause No. 11 C 5886, 2012 WL 3292838, at *2
(N.D.Ill. Aug. 10, 2012) (citing TCPA, 105 Stat. 2394, note
following 47 U.S.C. § 227 (Congressional statement of
findings)); Anderson v. AFNI, Inc., No. CIV.A.
10-4064, 2011 WL 1808779, at *6 (E.D. Pa. May 11, 2011).
See also Dkt. No. 45 at 10-11 (discussing Senator
Hollings', FCC Commissioner Jessica Rosenworcel's,
and FCC Chairman Tom Wheeler's remarks regarding the
purpose of the TCPA ...