Jason J. Maraman, Appellant-Defendant,
City of Carmel, Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
from the Hamilton Superior Court. The Honorable Wayne
Sturtevant, Judge. Trial Court Cause No. 29D05-1410-OV-8818.
J. Maraman, APPELLANT, Pro se, Indianapolis, Indiana.
FOR APPELLEE: Ashley M. Ulbricht, Carmel Assistant City
Attorney, Carmel, Indiana.
Judge. Crone, J., and Bradford, J., concur.
Jason Maraman challenges his citation for speeding. As the
Carmel city ordinance under which Maraman was ticketed was
void, the trial court should have granted Maraman's
motion to dismiss. We must accordingly reverse.
and Procedural History
Maraman was stopped for speeding in Carmel. The complaint and
summons issued to Maraman indicated he was driving 30 miles
per hour when the speed limit was 20, " [c]ontrary to
the form of the . . . Local Ordinance in such case made and
provided. L.O. No. 8-2."  (Appellant's App. at
10.) The Carmel City Court entered judgment against him and
he asked for a trial de novo.
When the cause was moved before the trial court, Maraman
filed a motion to dismiss that alleged, in pertinent part:
Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be
12. The complaint in the above captioned matter alleged
Defendant violated Carmel City Ordinance 8-2 which states:
Unless otherwise provided herein, the provisions set forth in
I.C.,[sic] 9-21-1-1 through 9-21-20-3 (Traffic Regulations)
are adopted by reference and made a part of this chapter with
the same force and effect as though set forth here verbatim.
(Carmel City Ordinance 8-2)
13. The powers granted to and specifically withheld from a
city are governed by I.C. 36-1-3, commonly referred to as the
Home Rule Act.
14. The power to prescribe a penalty for conduct constituting
a crime or infraction under statute is a power which is
specifically withheld pursuant to I.C. 36-1-3-8(a)(8).
15. Carmel City Ordinance 8-2 simply incorporates by
reference the portion of Indiana Code which defines motor
vehicle infractions. Therefore, the ordinance is a prima
facie violation of I.C. 36-1-3-8(a)(8) rendering the
ordinance null and void. As such, the ordinance is
unenforceable and fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted. Thus the complaint should be dismissed.
(Appellant's App. at 16) (header bolded in original).
The trial court denied Maraman's motion to dismiss.
Thereafter, the court found Maraman " did commit . . .
the infraction of Speeding under Carmel City Code
8-2," ( id. at 5) ...