United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, New Albany Division
ENTRY ON PNC'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
SARAH EVANS BARKER, District Judge.
This cause is before the Court on Counterclaimant PNC Bank's Motion for Summary Judgment, Decree of Foreclosure and Order of Sale [Docket No. 51], filed April 9, 2015. The Court GRANTS the motion for the reasons set forth below.
Factual and Procedural Background
This case is the third attempt by now-Counter Defendant Mia Daviner to dispute Counterclaimant PNC Bank, N.A.'s right to foreclose on her property. Unsuccessful in her first two suits, Daviner initiated this third suit against PNC in March of 2014. We granted PNC's motion to dismiss Daviner's claims in February of 2015. [Docket No. 39.]
PNC answered Daviner's Complaint with a two-count Counterclaim. PNC alleges that Daviner defaulted on a mortgage held by PNC and that PNC therefore is entitled to foreclose on the mortgage. [Docket No. 11 at 7-13.] PNC's case is simple:
(1) Daviner admits that she owns a parcel of real estate in North Vernon, Indiana. [Docket No. 11 at 9; Docket No. 46 at 1.]
(2) Daviner further admits that, in May of 2006, she executed a mortgage on that property and a promissory note in the principal amount of $105, 000 in favor of Prime 1 Mortgage Company. [Docket No. 11 at 10; Docket No. 11-1; Docket No. 11-2; Docket No. 46 at 1.]
(3) Prime 1 assigned the mortgage and the note to National City Mortgage- which later would become part of PNC-in October of 2006. [Docket No. 11-3.]
(4) Daviner has defaulted on the terms of the note and mortgage by failing to make payments. [Docket No. 11 at 11; Docket No. 51-1 at ¶ 8.]
Daviner has not presented evidence to dispute any of these claims.
Standard of Review
This case is before us based on diversity jurisdiction. "It is a long-recognized principle that federal courts sitting in diversity apply state substantive law and federal procedural law.'" Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 417, 130 S.Ct. 1431, 176 L.Ed.2d 311 (2010) (citing Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465, 85 S.Ct. 1136, 14 L.Ed.2d 8 (1965)). Consequently, Indiana law applies to the claims in this case, and federal law establishes the standard of review applicable to the motion for summary judgment.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that summary judgment should be granted when the record evidence shows that "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The purpose of summary judgment is to "pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Disputes concerning material facts are genuine where the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In deciding whether genuine issues of material fact exist, the court construes all facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See id. at 255. However, neither the "mere existence of alleged factual dispute between the parties, " id., 477 U.S. at 247, nor the existence of "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, will defeat a motion for summary judgment. Michas v. Health Cost Controls of Ill., Inc., 209 F.3d 687, 692 (7th Cir. 2000).
Here, PNC as the moving party "bear[s] the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for [its] motion, " and identifying those portions of the record that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Because PNC would bear the burden of proof at trial, Daviner may discharge her burden at ...