United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Terre Haute Division
RONALD C. JACKSON, Petitioner,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.
ENTRY DISCUSSING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND DENYING
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
LARRY J. McKINNEY, District Judge.
For the reasons explained in this Entry, the motion of Ronald Jackson ("Mr. Jackson") for relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 must be denied and the action dismissed with prejudice. In addition, the Court finds that a certificate of appealability should not issue.
I. The § 2255 Motion
On July 28, 2009, Mr. Jackson was charged in an Indictment with one count of possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) in 2:09-cr-011-LJM-CMM-1.
On January 14, 2010, Mr. Jackson filed a petition to enter a plea of guilty and a plea agreement pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. On August 5, 2010, the Court conducted a hearing on Mr. Jackson's petition to enter a plea of guilty. At the hearing, the Court advised Mr. Jackson of his rights and heard the factual basis for the plea. The Court determined that the plea was voluntarily and knowingly made. The Court accepted Mr. Jackson's plea of guilty and adjudged him guilty as charged.
A sentencing hearing was held on the same day. The Court sentenced Mr. Jackson to a term of 180 months in prison, to be followed by five years of supervised release. Judgment was entered on the docket on August 31, 2010.
Complying with the terms of the plea agreement, Mr. Jackson did not appeal his conviction or sentence. On December 16, 2013, Mr. Jackson filed his motion for relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. He placed that motion in the prison mailing system on December 9, 2013.
A motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is the presumptive means by which a federal prisoner can challenge his conviction or sentence. See Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 343 (1974). In his § 2255 motion, Mr. Jackson asserts that his sentence is illegal because one of his three prior convictions should not have qualified him as an Armed Career Criminal. He argues that counsel was ineffective by not challenging the prior convictions. The United States argues that Mr. Jackson's § 2255 motion is time-barred and also barred by the waiver of post-conviction relief rights found in the written plea agreement.
Statute of Limitations
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") establishes a one-year statute of limitations period for § 2255 motions. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). For purposes of § 2255(f)(1), that period runs from "the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final." Id. A judgment of conviction becomes final when the conviction is affirmed on direct review or when the time for perfecting an appeal expires. Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 527 (2003). As noted, the judgment of conviction was entered on the clerk's docket on August 31, 2010. Mr. Jackson's conviction became final on September 15, 2010. Using the one-year period from the date on which the judgment of conviction became final, Mr. Jackson's present motion would have to have been filed by September 15, 2011, to be timely. Applying the prison mailbox rule, see Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 271 (1988), Mr. Jackson's § 2255 motion can be considered to have been filed on the date he placed the motion in the prison mail system, December 9, 2013. That date was more than two years after the § 2255(f)(1) statute of limitations period expired. Mr. Jackson's motion is time barred, and Mr. Jackson does not argue that another provision of § 2255(f) applies.
Mr. Jackson acknowledges that his § 2255 motion was not timely filed under § 2255(f)(1). He argues that he should be entitled to equitable tolling. He asserts that it took him years to research and try to understand the law and that it is allowable to revisit an illegal sentence at any time upon its discovery. To the contrary, equitable tolling is proper only when a petitioner shows "(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing." Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2562 (2010) (internal quotation omitted). Mr. Jackson bears the burden of showing that his claim qualifies for equitable tolling. Taylor v. Michael, 724 F.3d 806, 810 (7th Cir. 2013).
Mr. Jackson has identified no actions he has taken in an effort to pursue this claim, much less shown diligence on his part. In addition, he has not identified any circumstance that prevented him from filing his claim in a timely manner. Mr. Jackson is not entitled to bring a claim for recalculating his sentence no matter how late it is filed. Petitioners must exercise diligence in asserting post-judgment ...