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Mamon v. Garrity

United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division

March 2, 2015

KEVIN J. MAMON, Plaintiff,
v.
RYAN GARRITY, et al., Defendants.

ENTRY GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, REMANDING STATE LAW CLAIMS, AND DIRECTING ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT

WILLIAM T. LAWRENCE, District Judge.

For the reasons explained in this Entry, the defendants' motion for summary judgment [dkt. 37] is granted. The plaintiff's motion for leave to file surreply [dkt. 63] is granted. The surreply filed on December 18, 2014, has been considered.

I. Background

The plaintiff in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action is Kevin J. Mamon ("Mr. Mamon"), who is currently confined at the Indiana State Prison. This action was removed to this Court from Madison Circuit Court 3. At all relevant times, Mr. Mamon was a pretrial detainee at the Hancock County Jail ("the Jail"). Mr. Mamon alleges that five Jail officers assaulted him. The defendants are 1) Ryan Garrity, 2) Jordan Conley, 3) Andy Craig, 4) Keith Oliver, 5) Kathy Pierce, and 6) the Hancock County Sheriff's Department.

Mr. Mamon alleges that the defendant Jail officers assaulted him by throwing fluids on him and then hitting him with their fists and dragging him by his head, upper body, and clothing, resulting in a "busted" top lip, contusion to his head, laceration to his mouth, and swelling and pain in his knee. Complaint, ¶ 4, dkt. 1-1. The complaint does not allege when this alleged assault occurred. In a supplemental statement of facts, Mr. Mamon alleges that on November 20, 2012, and February 26, 2013, the defendants were the "authors and instigators of an incident that did result in serious physical injury and harm to this Plaintiff and others." Dkt. 25, ¶ 6.

The complaint and another supplement thereto filed on April 1, 2014, purport to assert three federal claims, unreasonable search and seizure, excessive force, and retaliation, as violations of the Fourth, Fourteenth and First Amendments, respectively.[1] The complaint also alleges state law claims of assault and battery, abuse of authority, negligence, negligent supervision, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and respondeat superior liability. Mr. Mamon seeks compensatory and "exemplary" damages.

The defendants seeks resolution of Mr. Mamon's federal claims through the entry of summary judgment based on the affirmative defense that Mr. Mamon failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies prior to filing the complaint. They also request that any state law claims be dismissed without prejudice or, in the alternative, be remanded to the Madison Circuit Court. Mr. Mamon has opposed the motion for summary judgment and the defendants have replied.

II. Discussion

A. Legal Standards

Summary judgment should be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A "material fact" is one that "might affect the outcome of the suit." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is genuine only if a reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party. Id. If no reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party, then there is no "genuine" dispute. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). The Court views the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and all reasonable inferences are drawn in the non-movant's favor. Ault v. Speicher, 634 F.3d 942, 945 (7th Cir. 2011).

"The applicable substantive law will dictate which facts are material." National Soffit & Escutcheons, Inc., v. Superior Systems, Inc., 98 F.3d 262, 265 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). The substantive law applicable to the motion for summary judgment is the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA'"), which requires that a prisoner exhaust his available administrative remedies before bringing a suit concerning prison conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); see Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524-25 (2002). "[T]he PLRA's exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong." Id. at 532 (citation omitted).

"Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency's deadlines and other critical procedural rules because no adjudicative system can function effectively without imposing some orderly structure on the course of its proceedings." Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90-91 (2006) (footnote omitted); see also Dale v. Lappin, 376 F.3d 652, 655 (7th Cir. 2004) ("In order to properly exhaust, a prisoner must submit inmate complaints and appeals in the place, and at the time, the prison's administrative rules require.'") (quoting Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002)).

B. Undisputed Facts

On the basis of the pleadings and the expanded record, and specifically on the portions of that record which comply with the requirements of Rule 56(c), the following facts, construed in the manner most favorable to Mr. Mamon as the non-movant, ...


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