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Davis v. United Recovery Systems, LP

United States District Court, Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division

January 7, 2015

CATHERINE M. DAVIS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED RECOVERY SYSTEMS, LP, a Texas limited partnership, Defendant.

ENTRY ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Hon. William T. Lawrence, United States District Court Southern District of Indiana.

This cause is before the Court on the Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration (dkt. no. 33). Plaintiff Catherine M. Davis requests that the Court reconsider its decision to grant the Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings (dkt. no. 31). The motion is fully briefed, and the Court, being duly advised, DENIES the motion for the reasons set forth below.

In granting Defendant United Recovery Systems’ (“URS”) motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Court noted as follows in a footnote:

Although, in light of the case law discussed later in this entry, Davis’ waiver argument has some traction, under the facts of this case, there is currently no way around Taylor’s holding. Additionally, the “if applicable” language is not necessary where, as here, there is no dispute as to whether Capital One was entitled to seek interest from Davis.

Dkt. No. 21 at 4, n. 2 (emphasis added). Davis argues that the foregoing passage contains a “clear mistake of fact”; that is, Davis “does dispute that Capital One was entitled to seek interest, late fees or other charges after it charged off [her] account.” Davis’ Mot. at ¶ 4. Davis, however, takes the footnote out of context. The entire footnote reads as follows:

Davis argues that Taylor is “inapposite” for two reasons: First, it is based “on the assumption that the creditor still had [the] ability to charge interest, ” Davis’ Resp. at 7, —in other words, the Taylor court “never considered whether the original creditor had [officially] waived interest.” Id. at 6. Second, Davis argues that URS’s interest statement did not contain the qualifying terms “if applicable, ” which terms were found in the interest statement analyzed in Taylor, and which terms inform consumers that interest may only accrue “if the debtor’s original debt agreement provided for such interestId. at 7. Both arguments are without merit. Although, in light of the case law discussed later in this entry, Davis’ waiver argument has some traction, under the facts of this case, there is currently no way around Taylor’s holding. Additionally, the “if applicable” language is not necessary where, as here, there is no dispute as to whether Capital One was entitled to seek interest from Davis.

Dkt. No. 21 at 4, n. 2 (emphasis added). When read in context, it is clear that the Court’s reference to “whether Capital One was entitled to seek interest from Davis” refers to “the debtor’s original debt agreement” and Capital One’s ability to seek interest on Davis’ unpaid account in the first place—not Capital One’s ability to seek interest after it closed Davis’ account. Again, Davis does not dispute that Capital One was entitled to seek interest on Davis’ unpaid account before it allegedly closed her account. Thus, the Court was not mistaken regarding the facts or the arguments at issue in this case.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Court is still unconvinced that Taylor v. Cavalry Inv., LLC, 365 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2004) does not control the present case. Thus, the Plaintiffs motion for reconsideration is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.


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