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Scott v. Lear Corporation

United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, Hammond Division

November 4, 2014

DAVID A. SCOTT, JR., Plaintiff,


RUDY LOZANO, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Lear Corporation's ("Lear") Partial Motion to Dismiss, and Defendants Larry Payne, Barbara Sacha, Ryan Brueckner and Darrell Harper's (together, "Individual Defendants") Motion to Dismiss, filed on June 17, 2014. For the reasons set forth below, Lear's partial motion to dismiss is DENIED, and the Individual Defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED. The Individual Defendants are hereby DISMISSED from this case.


Plaintiff David A. Scott, Jr. ("Scott") was employed by Lear in its plant in Hammond, Indiana, between October 2010 and April 2013. ( See DE# 1-9.) On or about August 11, 2013, Scott filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") against Lear, alleging that he sustained a workplace injury and was required to work light duty assignments, but that Lear denied him reasonable accommodation, and eventually terminated his employment after he complained (1) about his treatment and (2) that Lear had afforded female employees with medical conditions more favorable treatment than male employees. ( See id. ) The EEOC issued its Dismissal and Notice of Rights on March 19, 2014. (DE #1 at 8.)

Proceeding pro se, Scott filed his complaint in this Court on April 4, 2014, using a preprinted "Employment Discrimination Complaint." (DE #1.) Scott's claims are being made pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") (42 U.S.C. § 12101), and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended ("Title VII") (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-s). Jurisdiction for these claims is based on 42 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a). The complaint names Lear and the Individual Defendants (together, the "Defendants"), and alleges violations of the ADA, gender discrimination, retaliation, harassment, and wrongful termination. Regarding Scott's wrongful termination claim, the complaint states in part:

On April 23, 2013 the defendants wrongfully terminated the plaintiff because of medical leave that they put me on because of a pending work related injury and wouldn't allow me to return to work under their policy so a grievance was filed on my behalf on the 24th of April 2013 but no steps or meetings were held for 320 day[s] and no contact to myself but straight to mediation and a denial of my grievance and being told that there [were] no other steps after mediation except to agree to this $4, 000 settlement and drop all pending charges I have against the defendants and the union. My grievance was for being terminated for medical leave and didn't have anything to do with my other complaints or charges....

(DE# 1 at 7.)

On June 17, 2014, Lear filed a partial motion to dismiss, seeking dismissal of Scott's wrongful discharge claim. (DE# 16.) On the same day, the Individual Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Scott's complaint against them. (DE# 19.) In support of both motions, the Defendants submitted unsigned copies of the collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") entered into by Lear's Hammond Indiana Plant and the International United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAW, and its affiliated Local Union 2335 ("Union"). ( See DE## 21, 21-1, 22, 22-1.) The CBA was not attached to Scott's complaint.

Scott filed responses to both motions to dismiss on September 2, 2014. (DE## 25, 26.) In those responses, Scott acknowledged the existence of the CBA and asked that "the CBA agreement be added in for support of my complaints." (DE# 25 at 3; DE# 26 at 4.) On September 11, 2014, Scott also filed a "Motion in Response to Lear Corporation and Defendants Submission in Support to Dismiss, " in which he asserted that Lear and the Union never supplied him with a copy of the CBA during his employment.[1] (DE# 27.)

The Defendants filed their reply briefs on September 30, 2014, attaching copies of two charges Scott had filed with the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") and the EEOC against the Union in 2012 and 2013, respectively. (DE## 29, 30.)

On October 9, 2014, Scott filed two surreply briefs, attaching three more NLRB charges that Scott had filed against Lear and the Union in 2014, as well as his correspondence with the NLRB and the Union president. (DE## 31, 32.)


Motion to Dismiss Standard

In evaluating a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must accept all facts alleged in the complaint as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Parish v. City of Elkhart, 614 F.3d 677, 679 (7th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). While a complaint is not required to contain detailed factual allegations, the plaintiff must allege facts that state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. at 678. "While a complaint... does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds' of his entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions.... Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (internal citations and quotations omitted). A pro se complaint, ...

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