United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division
For MICHAEL HOLZMEYER, Plaintiff, Counter Defendant: Bridget L. O'Ryan, O'RYAN LAW FIRM, Indianapolis, IN.
For WALGREEN INCOME PROTECTION PLAN FOR PHARMACISTS AND REGISTERED NURSES, Defendant, Counter Claimant: Eric P. Mathisen, Mark E. Schmidtke, OGLETREE DEAKINS NASH SMOAK & STEWART, P.C. - Valpo, Valparaiso, IN; Kimberly A. Jones, OGLETREE DEAKINS NASH SMOAK & STEWART, P.C.-Chicago, Chicago, IL.
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON DEFENDANT'S COUNTERCLAIM
SARAH EVANS BARKER, United States District Judge.
This cause is before the Court on Defendant-Counterclaimant Walgreen Income Protection Plan's (" the Plan" ) Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 29], filed on October 1, 2013, and Defendant-Counterclaimant's Motion to Amend [Docket No. 36], filed on September 10, 2014. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant-Counterclaimant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED in relevant part, and the motion to amend is GRANTED.
In August and October, 2013, respectively, the parties submitted cross motions for summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim for long-term disability benefits pursuant to ERISA. In addition to seeking summary
judgment on Plaintiff's principal claim, Defendant's motion also sought summary judgment on its counterclaim for reimbursement of overpayment [Docket No. 22]. The Court's Order of September 4, 2014 [Docket No. 36] granted Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and denied Defendant's motion for summary judgment with respect to this principal claim, but it did not address Defendant's counterclaim.
Standard of Review
A. For summary judgment under Rule 56
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that summary judgment should be granted when the record evidence shows that " there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The purpose of summary judgment is to " pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Disputes concerning material facts are genuine where the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In deciding whether genuine issues of material fact exist, the court construes all facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See id. at 255. However, neither the " mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties," id., 477 U.S. at 247, nor the existence of " some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, will defeat a motion for summary judgment. Michas v. Health Cost Controls of Ill., Inc., 209 F.3d 687, 692 (7th Cir. 2000).
B. Under Rule 60(a)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a) authorizes the district court to " correct a clerical mistake or a mistake arising from oversight or omission whenever one is found in a judgment." Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 60(a). Motions to amend under Rule 60(a) are not the proper vehicle for relief where the original judgment is " infected by error," either legal or factual; rather, they serve to allow the remedying of clerical ...