United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division
For STACY PATRICK, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, formerly known as, COMPTON, Plaintiff: Angie K. Robertson, Mary E. Philipps, David J. Philipps, PHILIPPS & PHILIPPS LTD, Palos Hills, IL; John Thomas Steinkamp, JOHN T. STEINKAMP AND ASSOCIATES, Indianapolis, IN.
For PYOD, LLC, a DE LLC, RESURGENT CAPITAL SERVICES, LP, a DE limited partnership, Defendants: Jeanine R. Kerridge, BARNES & THORNBURG LLP, Indianapolis, IN; John P. Boyle, MOSS & BARNETT, P.A., Minneapolis, MN.
ENTRY ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
RICHARD L. YOUNG, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Plaintiff, Stacy Patrick (" Plaintiff" ), is a participant in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding. Plaintiff alleges that PYOD, LLC (" PYOD" ) and Resurgent Capital Services, LP (" Resurgent" ) violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (" FDCPA" ), 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5), by filing two proofs of claim that were barred by the Indiana statute of limitations and subsequently disallowed by the bankruptcy court. Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is DENIED.
During the year 2003, Plaintiff defaulted on two credit card obligations. (Complaint ¶ 9). After these obligations became delinquent, they were assigned to PYOD. ( Id.). Ultimately, Plaintiff filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition. ( Id. at ¶ 10).
On July 25, 2013, Resurgent filed two proofs of claim on behalf of PYOD related to the credit card obligations in Plaintiff's bankruptcy proceeding. ( Id.). According to Indiana Code § 34-11-2, the statute of limitations in Indiana relating to the collection of delinquent credit card debts is six years. ( Id.). In the case of both claims filed by Resurgent, the date of last activity related to the account was more than six years prior to the date of filing. ( Id. at ¶ 11).
On July 26, 2013, Plaintiff's bankruptcy counsel objected to the time-barred proofs of claim in bankruptcy court. ( Id. at ¶ 12). On September 3, 2013, the objections were sustained and the claims were disallowed. ( Id. at ¶ 13).
II. Motion to Dismiss Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows dismissal of a claim for " failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court construes the allegations of the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and all well-pleaded, nonconclusory, factual allegations in the complaint are accepted as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Taken in this light, the complaint's " allegations must plausibly suggest that the plaintiff has a right to relief, raising that possibility above a 'speculative level.'" EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). " A claim has a facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
A. FDCPA Overview and Purpose