United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division
ALVIN D. MACKLIN, Plaintiff,
ROLLS-ROYCE CORPORATION, Defendant.
ENTRY ON DEFENDANT'S PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS
TANYA WALTON PRATT, District Judge.
The matter is before the Court on Rolls-Royce Corporation's ("Rolls-Royce") Partial Motion to Dismiss, requesting the Court dismiss Counts I, III, IV, and VI of the Complaint filed by Plaintiff, Alvin D. Macklin, ("Mr. Macklin"), pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Mr. Macklin filed this lawsuit against his former employer, Rolls-Royce, for violations of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § § 2000e et. seq., alleging they discriminated against him on the basis of his race (African-American), color (Black) and sex (male) and that he was subjected to a hostile work environment. For the reasons set forth below, Rolls-Royce's Partial Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 9), is GRANTED.
For the purposes of a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept the complaint's wellpleaded allegations as true and draw all favorable inferences for the plaintiff. Killingsworth v. HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., 507 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir. 2007). Thus, the factual allegations as alleged in Mr. Macklin's Complaint are accepted as true.
Mr. Macklin, began working for Rolls-Royce on September 28, 2010 as a Custodian. As a Rolls-Royce employee, he met or exceeded all legitimate performance expectations. After Mr. Macklin signed up to work all of the available holiday shifts in 2011-2012, three of his Caucasian, female co-workers complained of sexual harassment to Mr. Macklin's supervisors, without his knowledge.
On January 2, 2012, Mr. Macklin went to his manager's office, where he noticed on the desk, in plain sight, his name written on a note pad, with notes detailing the harassment complaint. When he inquired about the matter, he was told the complaint was a "confidential matter" and that as a "precaution" he was being suspended for the day with pay. Two days later, Mr. Macklin met with his manager, a human resources representative, and a union representative. He was informed that he was being charged with "violation of company confidential papers and stalking." Mr. Macklin denied all of the allegations brought against him, but at the end of the meeting, he was informed that he was being terminated for "sexual harassment" and "multiple shop violations." Mr. Macklin alleges that, by terminating him "without an investigation, and without regard for progressive discipline, " Rolls-Royce discriminated against him because of his race, color, and sex. As a result of his termination, Mr. Macklin "suffered and continues to suffer harm, including but not limited to loss of wages and benefits, emotional distress, embarrassment, humiliation, and damage to his personal and professional reputation."
On January 11, 2012, Mr. Macklin filed a Complaint of Discrimination with the City of Indianapolis/Marion County Office of Equal Opportunity ("Office of Equal Opportunity"). The Office of On December 20, 2012, he received a Final Order. On March 19, 2103 Mr. Macklin filed his Complaint in the district court. In Counts I, III, IV and VI, he alleges violations of Title VII.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
When reviewing a 12(b)(6) motion, the Court takes all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and draws all inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Bielanski v. Cnty. of Kane, 550 F.3d 632, 633 (7th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). However, the allegations must "give the defendant fair notice of what the... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests" and the "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Pisciotta v. Old Nat'l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 633 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Stated differently, the complaint must include "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 580 (7th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). To be facially plausible, the complaint must allow "the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted).
A. Mr. Macklin failed to satisfy Title VII's requirement that a plaintiff exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing suit.
Before bringing suit under Title VII, a plaintiff must exhaust their administrative remedies by filing a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), or comparable cooperating state agency, within 300 days of the conduct complained of. Salas v. Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections, 493 F.3d 913, 921-22 (7th Cir. 2007). "Title VII does not authorize the filing of suit until the plaintiff has exhausted his administrative remedies, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c), which means not until he has received a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, signifying that the EEOC will not provide him with any relief." Hill v. Potter, 352 F.3d 1142, 1145 (7th Cir. 2003). "Failure to file a timely charge with the EEOC precludes a subsequent lawsuit under Title VII." Salas v. Wisconsin Dep't of Corr., 493 F.3d 913, 921 (7th Cir. 2007).
Mr. Macklin admits that he did not file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, and he does not claim to have received a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. Thus, he has plainly failed to meet the statutory requirements, and a lawsuit under Title VII is precluded unless he can identify an exception to these requirements.
B. Mr. Macklin does not argue that the City of Indianapolis/Marion County Office of Equal Opportunity is a ...